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Djordjevic´, Vladan
Goodman’s only world.
Between logic and reality, 269–280, Log. Epistemol. Unity Sci., 25, Springer,
Dordrecht, 2012
The first part of Djordjevic´’s article is a critical investigation both of Nelson
Goodman’s analysis of so-called counterfactuals (cf. [2, 3]) and of the reception
which Goodman’s approach has met within logical semantics. The final part of
the article is a plea that Goodman’s approach is still worth consideration in the
more advanced framework of a possible-worlds-semantics for counterfactuals.
A counterfactual is a conditional statement in the subjunctive mode; the
use of that mode indicates that the antecedent is considered false. According
to Goodman’s analysis (as put forward in [2]), such a counterfactual A→ C is
true iff there is a set of support propositions S such that (α) S∪{C}, S∪{¬C},
and S ∪ {A} are all consistent and the third set entails C; while (β) there is
no set S′ such that again the three sets S′ ∪ {C}, S′ ∪ {¬C}, and S′ ∪ {A}
are consistent and the third sets entails ¬C. (Be aware that the arrow is used
for the main connective of a counterfactual conditional and does not stand for
material implication.) Reacting to a critique by William T. Parry [6], Goodman
[3] modified his approach by adding the additional requirement (γ) that S should
be “contenable” with A where, generally, E is said to be contenable with D iff
¬(D → ¬E). Djordjevic´ points out that it is not clear whether (γ) should be
understood as requiring that each member of S should be cotenable with A or
as postulating that the conjunction of the elements of S (which thus should be
a finite set) should be cotenable with that proposition.
Of course, Goodman’s modified explanation of counterfactuals cannot be
considered as providing the truth conditions for such statements since it presup-
poses the notion of a counterfactual by making use of the relation of cotenability.
Though Goodman thus does not deliver a reductive definition of the truth condi-
tions of counterfactuals in terms of such notions as consequence and consistency,
it may, as Djordjevic´ argues, nevertheless function as a valuable source of in-
spiration for the construction of logical systems for counterfactuals. However,
Goodman’s approach has, as Djordjevic´ shows, been wrongly understood and
mutilated by many of his more recent commentators. The main misunderstand-
ing concerns the support set S: according to a widely accepted interpretation
of Goodman it contains all true statements which are cotenable with the an-
tecedent. But, as Djordjevic´ points out, several authors have recognized that
this interpretation implies the debated principle of conditional excluded middle
(CEM), (A→ B)∨ (A→ ¬B), which is explicitly rejected by Goodman. Good-
man conceives of A→ B and A→ ¬B as contraries rather than contradictories;
they cannot be both true but they can be false simultaneously.
Several authors have noted this connection; Djordjevic´ cites Cross [1], Loewer
[4], and Ma˚rtensen [5]. In the last part of his article, he himself provides a
proof for this result within the framework of possible worlds semantics, which
thus yields a more intuitive rendering of the result which makes rather clear
what it actually amounts to. On an informal level his argument may be stated
thus: Let for a given A, S be the set of those B which are true in the real
world and cotenable with A. Then, among the propositions which are actually
true, those propositions D are excluded from S which are incompatible with
A, i. e., those which would be false if A were true. This means that S is a
partial description of a world which differs from the real one only by excluding
everything incompatible with A. Adding A to that partial description will hence
make it complete in the sense that there will be only one single maximally
consistent set containing S ∪{A} as a subset; i. e., S ∪{A} determines uniquely
one single world. This is the content of Djordjevic´’ Theorem 2 and explains
the title of his article. But then it is clear that A → C or A → ¬C since the
maximally consistent set will contain either C or its negation.
The argument sketched in the previous paragraph transfers the basic idea of
the minimal change theory of counterfactuals (cf., e. g., David Lewis’ well-known
book Counterfactual ; MR0421986 and MR1865986) to Goodman’s framework:
in evaluating a counterfactual we change the description of the actual world only
minimally in order to include the antecedent as a true proposition. Seen from
Goodman’s point of view, this theory amounts to admitting to the support set
everything contenable with the antecedent. This, however, is in conflict with
Goodman’s rejection of the (CEM). The modified minimal change approach
would have been blocked in advance if we understood Goodman’s contenability
condition in such a way that the conjunction of the members of the support
set are contenable with the antecedent. In that case the support set has to
be finite whereas the support sets of the modified minimal change theory are
infinite. In the last part of his article Djordjevic´ shows that different decisions
about what to include into the support sets leads up to different logical systems
for counterfactuals. Blowing up the support sets leads up to strong systems
whereas meager support sets yield weak systems. This illustrates how consid-
erations carried out within Goodman’s theory can be used as heuristics for the
development of more modern approaches within the possible-worlds-framework.
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